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WILKES V. SPRINGSIDE NURSING HOME,
INC.: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN*
INTRODUCTION
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. the Supreme Judi
cial Court of Massachusetts decided that a shareholder in a closely
held corporation could not be frozen out from participating in the
corporation unless there was a legitimate business reason for his
exclusion and this business purpose “could [not] have been
achieved through an alternative course of action less harmful to the
minority’s interest.”1 This opinion was preceded, fifteen months
earlier, by Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., where the same court
decided that a minority shareholder in a closely held corporation
had to be extended an “equal opportunity” to sell her shares back
to the corporation if that privilege was afforded to a controlling
shareholder.2 Both cases were grounded on the rationale that a
closely held corporation ought to be viewed as a partnership and, as
such, the shareholders owe to one another the fiduciary duties that
partners owe to one another.3
Interestingly, in neither case did the court delve into the intri
cacies of partnership law.4 Rather, the court seemed to assume that
if partnership law applied, the plaintiff in each case would prevail.5
While the court’s unstated assumption may not be correct—espe
cially in a fact situation like the one in Donahue 6 —the notion that
* Monfort Professor of Commercial Law, University of Colorado Law School.
The author thanks Shirin Chahal (Class of 2011) and Laura Ellenberger (Class of 2011)
for their excellent research assistance. Ms. Chahal was also the primary author of Part
III of this Article. The author also thanks Professors Andrew Schwartz and Eric
Gouvin for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
2. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 519 (Mass. 1975).
3. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
4. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661-62; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512.
5. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 519-20.
6. See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 377, 439-40 (2004) (noting that partnership fiduciary law does not serve the
function of prohibiting freeze-outs or requiring equal treatment, but rather, these con
cepts are statutory).
339

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

340

unknown

Seq: 2

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

9:02

[Vol. 33:339

shareholders owe fiduciary duties to their co-shareholders would
certainly give rise to shareholder liability in many circumstances in
which liability would not otherwise arise.7 To take a simple exam
ple, in the absence of a fiduciary duty a shareholder may purchase
shares from a co-shareholder without disclosing material informa
tion known to the buyer but not known to the seller.8 Fiduciary
duty changes that.9
Donahue and Wilkes are each cases that could have reached
the same conclusions on narrower grounds. In the case of Donahue, the court could have decided that the directors who authorized
the repurchase had a conflict of interest and thus bore the burden
of proving that their decision was fair to the corporation.10 While
this may not have given plaintiff all she sought in the case, a remand
would have given her leverage for a favorable settlement and, in the
future, inhibited those controlling a corporation from favoring the
interests of related stockholders. In Wilkes, the court could have
ruled that the parties had a contractual understanding that they
would all be directors, officers, and employees of the company, an
understanding breached by the defendants.11 Alternatively, the
court could have ruled that the payments to the defendants were at
least partially constructive dividends in which the plaintiff should
have shared. But, as in Donahue, these rulings might not have
given the plaintiff all he sought and, perhaps more importantly,
would have precluded the broad doctrinal change made by these
precedents.

7. Id. at 417.
8. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 229 (1980) (“[A] purchaser of
stock who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither an insider nor a
fiduciary has been held to have no obligation to reveal material facts.”); see also Gen.
Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968).
9. Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 435 (7th Cir. 1987); Van Schaack
Holdings, Ltd. v. Van Schaack, 867 P.2d 892, 898 (Colo. 1994); Bailey v. Vaughan, 359
S.E.2d 599, 605 (W. Va. 1987).
10. E.g., Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 819 (2009) (“Where a fiduciary is
taking advantage of an opportunity for his own profit, he has the burden to show that
all material facts were disclosed and that his actions did not harm the corporation and
were fundamentally fair.” (citing Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts. Inc., 677 N.E.2d
159, 180 (1997))).
11. Wilkes, in his appellate brief, argued that the parties had a pre-incorporation
agreement regarding the respective roles of the parties and their compensation. Wilkes
v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659 n.2 (Mass. 1976). This agree
ment, he argued, gave the parties fiduciary duties that continued on regardless of the
form of the type of business entity that they formed. See id. at 659.
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These two holdings, thus, are widely recognized as changing
corporate law.12 To what extent is this assessment accurate? What
was the state of the law when Wilkes and Donahue were decided?
Were these decisions part of an activist streak by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, or aberrational to its jurisprudence? Did
the decisions stimulate legislative action, or retard it? This Article
seeks to answer, at least preliminarily, these questions, proceeding
first, in Part I, with an analysis of the precedent and other authority
supporting and undermining the decisions. Part II then considers
the nature of the court at the time of these decisions, looking briefly
at other significant precedents decided by the court. Part III re
views statutory provisions dealing with minority shareholders and
Part IV considers other post-1975 developments in business associa
tion law.
I. PRECEDENT CITED

BY THE

COURT

Donahue was a precedent-setting decision and, unsurprisingly,
the court cited no authority for the key holding in the case13:
The rule of equal opportunity in stock purchases by close
corporations provides equal access to these benefits for all stock
holders. We hold that, in any case in which the controlling stock
holders have exercised their power over the corporation to deny
the minority such equal opportunity, the minority shall be enti
tled to appropriate relief.14

The court cited no precedent for the first sentence, and for the
second included a footnote explaining that “[e]ven under the tradi
tional standard of duty applicable to corporate directors and stock
holders generally, this court has looked favorably upon stockholder
12. See, e.g., ROBERT HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
482 (8th ed. 2003) (“The basic holding of Donahue that fiduciary relationships exist
within closely held corporations has been widely cited and accepted. Courts in more
than 25 states have either cited Donahue approvingly or have cited cases that relied
upon Donahue for this proposition.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fis
chel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 293-95 (1986) (call
ing Donahue a “much applauded” decision).
13. This holding was foreshadowed earlier in the opinion: “[I]f the stockholder
whose shares were purchased was a member of the controlling group, the controlling
stockholders must cause the corporation to offer each stockholder an equal opportunity
to sell a ratable number of his shares to the corporation at an identical price.” Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 518 (Mass. 1975). The court did not cite any
authority for this statement, but did indicate in a footnote that stockholders could give
advance consent to a selective repurchase or could ratify it after the fact. Id. at 518
n.24.
14. Id. at 519.
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challenges to stock issues which, in violation of a fiduciary duty,
served personal interests of other stockholder/directors and did not
serve the corporate interest.”15 Of course, stock issuances can oc
cur only upon the approval of the board of directors, who must act
in the best interests of the corporation.16 Donahue extends this
concept because it requires those controlling the corporation to act
in the personal interest of an individual stockholder, not just in the
corporate interest.17 Under Donahue, if a stock repurchase from a
controlling stockholder is in the best interests of the corporation,
and a repurchase from a minority stockholder is not, the equal op
portunity rule mandates the second repurchase, if that stockholder
desires to sell.18 In that sense, Donahue stands traditional fiduciary
duty on its head, at least for directors seeking to act in the best
interests of the corporation.
Donahue and, therefore, Wilkes, did rely on four earlier Mas
sachusetts cases to support the principle that stockholders control
ling a closely held corporation are to be held “to a standard of
fiduciary duty more exacting than the traditional good faith and in
herent fairness standard.”19 The earliest of these was Silversmith v.
Sydeman,20 which the Donahue court characterized as implying
that a stockholder-officer liquidating a corporation would be sub
ject to “a more rigorous standard of fiduciary duty”21 in light of the
fact that there were only two stockholders who acted as “partners”
in the conduct and liquidation of the corporation.22 But the actual
holding in Silversmith was unaffected by this observation; the de
fendant breached his duty of loyalty and good faith regardless of
how his relationship with his co-owner was characterized.23 While
15. Id. at 519 n.25 (emphasis added). The court cited as examples L. E. Fosgate
Co. v. Boston Mkt. Terminal Co., 175 N.E. 86 (Mass. 1931); Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450
(Mass. 1907); cf. Andersen v. Albert & J. M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 90 N.E.2d 541 (Mass.
1950). Id.
16. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.21(b); see also Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, 744
F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984).
17. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518-19.
18. Id. at 519.
19. Id. at 516.
20. Silversmith v. Sydeman, 25 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1940).
21. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (citing Silversmith, 25 N.E.2d at 68) (discussing
how the relationship between the stockholders was like a partnership and despite the
fact that the parties “had adopted [the] corporate form” to conduct their business, they
would be held to the same fiduciary duty standard as the partners).
22. Id.
23. Silversmith, 25 N.E.2d at 217. The defendant, essentially, paid himself com
pensation and charged the corporation interest on a note, in each case without proper
authorization. Id. at 217.
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the case did include dictum to the effect that “the plaintiff and de
fendant were acting as partners,”24 this was more a factual observa
tion than a legal conclusion and, in any event, was irrelevant to the
holding in the case.25 Similarly, in Samia v. Central Oil Co.,26 the
second case cited by the Donahue court,27 the defendants engaged
in acts of self-dealing and breach of trust that justified recovery by
the plaintiffs regardless of the size of the corporation.28 Indeed,
some of the acts were outside the corporation, such as one defen
dant’s improper acts as the executor of an estate.29 The court in
Donahue cited to its Samia dictum that the corporation there was a
small family corporation, but, again, this observation did not influ
ence the outcome of the case.30
The third case cited by the Donahue court was Sher v. Sandler,31 which, tellingly, was not discussed by the court.32 In it, one
stockholder in a two-person corporation purchased the stock of the
other without disclosing material information known to the buyer
but not the seller.33 The seller was successful in a suit for rescission
because the buyer failed to disclose the information.34 The buyer’s
disclosure obligation, however, arose because of an express contract
between the parties that required each to keep the other fully in
formed of “all transactions relating to the business,”35 a fact that
the Sher court acknowledged.36
The final cited case, which also was not discussed by the
court,37 was Mendelsohn v. Leather Manufacturing Corp. and, like
Sher, involved the sale of stock from one stockholder in a closely
held corporation to another.38 And, as in Sher, there was an allega
24. Id.
25. Id. at 217, 220.
26. Samia v. Cent. Oil Co., 158 N.E.2d 469 (Mass. 1959).
27. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (citing Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 469).
28. Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 476.
29. Id.
30. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517 (citing Samia, 158 N.E.2d at 476).
31. Sher v. Shandler, 90 N.E.2d 536 (Mass. 1950).
32. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517.
33. Sher, 90 N.E.2d at 538. This information concerned the fact that negotiations
to conclude a lease favorable to the corporation were near completion and would en
hance the corporation’s value. Id.
34. Id. at 540.
35. Id. at 537.
36. Id. at 539 (“It was the defendant’s duty, under the agreement referred to
above, to disclose all information necessary to enable the plaintiff to form a sound judg
ment of the value of the interest that he was selling.” (emphasis added)).
37. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 517.
38. Mendelsohn v. Leather Mfg. Corp., 93 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Mass. 1950).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

344

unknown

Seq: 6

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

9:02

[Vol. 33:339

tion that the buyer failed to make full disclosure to the seller.39 The
court seemed to acknowledge that the buyer owed duties of disclo
sure to the seller,40 but this was dictum because the seller also sub
sequently signed a general release at a time in which he appeared to
be fully informed of all material facts.41 Without the release, the
plaintiff-seller might still have prevailed because the buyer was an
officer and director of the corporation, and that circumstance pre
cluded the buyer from purchasing shares from an outside stock
holder without disclosing material, nonpublic information.42 But it
is the buyer’s status as a corporate insider that gives rise to the dis
closure obligation, not the fact that the corporation is closely held.
In short, then, the supporting authority for the holding in
Donahue was weak, at best. In contrast, existing Massachusetts
precedent, which denied that stockholders in closely held
corporations owed one another a fiduciary duty, suggested a
contrary result, as the court readily acknowledged.43 And prece
39. Id. at 540-41.
40. Id. at 542 (“The mere absence of affirmative false representations, of course,
would not preclude the plaintiff [seller] from impeaching the transaction. By reason of
the fiduciary relationship existing between the parties [the buyer] could be guilty of
fraud by failing to disclose to the plaintiff relevant facts concerning the operations of
the enterprise.”); see also Sher, 90 N.E.2d at 539-40; Akin v. Warner, 63 N.E.2d 566, 570
(Mass. 1945); Reed v. A.E. Little, 152 N.E. 918, 920 (Mass. 1926); Flynn v. Colbert, 146
N.E. 784, 786 (Mass. 1925); Arnold v. Maxwell, 111 N.E. 687, 689 (Mass. 1916).
41. Mendelsohn, 90 N.E.2d at 542-43.
42. Id. at 541. This is the so-called “special fact doctrine,” which creates an ex
ception to the general rule that the buyer has no duty to disclose and is imposed when
the buyer is a corporate insider in possession of material nonpublic information and the
seller is an outsider unaware of the information. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431
(1909).
43. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517 (Mass. 1975) (citing
Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 1952) (“Statements in other cases . . . which
suggest that stockholders of a corporation do not stand in a relationship of trust and
confidence to one another will not be followed in the close corporation context.” (cita
tions omitted)); Leventhal v. Atlantic Fin. Corp., 55 N.E.2d 20 (Mass. 1944); Mairs v.
Madden, 30 N.E.2d 242 (Mass. 1940)).
Cardullo arose out of a sale by defendant of his 50% stock ownership in the corpo
ration to the plaintiff, who was a 50% owner at the time of the sale. Cardullo, 105
N.E.2d at 844. Plaintiff complained that the defendant failed to disclose what defen
dant had paid for the shares and that a general release, previously executed by the
plaintiff, should not bar his claim. Id. The court said that plaintiff’s claim rested on
finding a fiduciary duty from the defendant to the plaintiff because the release was
“very comprehensive.” Id. at 845. The relationship of the parties, as co-owners of a
firm, was insufficient to give rise to a fiduciary duty between them. Id. at 846.
In Leventhal, one of two stockholders in a two-stockholder corporation brought a
suit in equity for interpretation of a contract between the two stockholders. Leventhal,
55 N.E.2d at 22. For reasons that are not articulated in the opinion, plaintiff argued that
the contract created a partnership, and this was rejected by the court. Id. The court
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dent from outside of Massachusetts also ran counter to
Donahue.44
Early in the opinion, the Donahue court cited and quoted from
a 1957 federal district court case from the District of Columbia,
Helms v. Duckworth,45 to support the idea that a closely held cor
poration should be treated differently from corporations with a
larger stockholder base.46 Helms, which was widely cited in the
treatises and articles that the Donahue court relied upon, involved
a buy/sell agreement in a two-person corporation.47 The agreement
provided that upon the death of either stockholder, the survivor
would buy the decedent’s shares at the price designated in the
found that “[i]t was the intention of all the parties that the corporation should continue
to conduct its business as a corporation.” Id.
In Mairs, the defendants purchased outstanding stock and thereby gained control.
Mairs, 30 N.E.2d at 244-46. These purchases were made by the defendants while, as
directors, they were negotiating with a third party who was seeking to acquire control of
the corporation. Id. The defendants’ purchase had the effect of mooting the third
party’s offer, since it was conditioned on obtaining control. Id. Plaintiffs complained
that the defendants’ actions deprived them of the opportunity to tender their shares to
the third party and, as control now rested with defendants, the value of plaintiffs’ stock
was impaired. Id. The court denied relief, partially on the basis that the defendants, as
stockholders, did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs. Id.
44. E.g., Bellows v. Porter, 201 F.2d 429, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1953) (“‘To warrant the
interposition of the court in favor of the minority shareholders . . . , where such action is
within the corporate powers, a case must be made out which plainly shows that such
action is so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the
clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire
to secure such interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some
outside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the company, and in a manner in
consistent with its interests.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Gamble v. Queens Cnty.
Water Co., 25 N.E. 201, 202 (Mass. 1890))); Keck v. Schumacher, 198 So. 2d 39, 43 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (denying minority stockholder’s claim for dissolution despite her
termination as an employee of the corporation); Hyman v. Velsicol, 97 N.E.2d 122, 124
(Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (holding that reorganization adversely affecting minority stock
holder would be upheld because it was in the corporation’s interest that it proceed);
Keough v. St. Paul Milk Co., 285 N.W. 809, 820 (Minn. 1953) (“While stockholders in a
corporation owe the duty of good faith to each other in the management of the affairs
of the corporation, they do not stand to each other in a fiduciary relation within the rule
we have stated.” (quoting Bjorngaard v. Goodhue Cnty. Bank, 52 N.W. 48, 49 (Minn.
1892))); Gottfried v. Gottfried, 73 N.Y.S.2d 692, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1947) (noting, in dictum,
that terminating the employment of a minority stockholder in a closely held corporation
can result in hardship, but adding that “[n]evertheless, such situations do not in them
selves form a ground for the interposition of a court of equity”); Boss v. Boss, 200 A.2d
231, 234 (R.I. 1964) (holding that in dealing in corporate shares, shareholders can act in
their own self-interests).
45. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
46. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 511-13.
47. Helms, 249 F.2d at 483.
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agreement.48 Although the agreement contemplated that the price
would be adjusted periodically by written consent, no such written
modification was ever executed.49 The administratrix petitioner ar
gued that the stock was worth considerably more than the price
specified in the agreement and enforcement would be unfair.50 The
court found that in a two-person venture such as this, there was a
relationship of trust between the stockholders and each had to deal
with each other fairly, honestly, and openly in order for the organi
zation to survive.51 Accordingly, the court held that the surviving
shareholder had a duty to bargain under the purchase agreement in
good faith.52 Helms does support the notion that stockholders in a
closely held corporation must deal with one another in good faith,
but that good faith notion applies with equal force to all contractual
obligations.53 Normal contract doctrines of interpretation and good
faith might have resulted in the same outcome.54
Like Donahue, Wilkes rested on a thin reed. It relied heavily,
of course, on Donahue and, like Donahue, proceeded from the as
sumption that stockholders in a closely held corporation owed one
another partner-like fiduciary duties.55 But Wilkes cut back slightly
on Donahue, affording the controlling stockholders who have dis
advantaged the minority stockholder the opportunity to demon
strate that their actions had “a legitimate business purpose.”56 If
they do so, “it is [up] to minority stockholders to demonstrate that
the same legitimate objective could have been achieved though an
48. Id. at 484.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 487.
52. Id. at 486.
53. Id.; see U.C.C. § 1-304 (2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205
(1981).
54. See generally Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Con
tract Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
559, 581 (2006) (“[E]ven where no statutory authority exists to vary the ‘plain meaning’
of contract language, courts will do so based on common law principles of interpreta
tion and gap-filling where such language is clearly at odds with parties’ expectations.”).
Professor Dubroff discusses the well-known Massachusetts case of Spaulding v. Morris,
76 N.E.2d 137 (Mass. 1947), where the court quoted from an earlier Massachusetts case
that announced a broad rule of interpretation: “‘Every instrument in writing is to be
interpreted, with a view to the material circumstances of the parties at the time of the
execution, in the light of the pertinent facts within their knowledge and in such manner
as to give effect to the main end designed to be accomplished.’” Id. (quoting Dit
temore v. Dickey, 144 N.E. 57, 60 (Mass. 1924)).
55. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661-64 (Mass.
1976).
56. Id. at 663.
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alternative course of action less harmful to the minority’s inter
est.”57 For both of these propositions, the Wilkes court cited a New
York case, Schwartz v. Marien,58 and for the first proposition the
court also cited a federal district court case from Georgia, Bryan v.
Brock & Blevins Co. 59
Schwartz v. Marien does indeed support the proposition that
when the board of directors takes an action that disadvantages a
minority stockholder, it bears the burden of demonstrating that it
had a “bona fide business purpose” that served the “best interests
of the corporation.”60 Schwartz also suggested that, under the cir
cumstances of that case, even if the board could demonstrate such a
purpose, it must also demonstrate that “such objective could not
have been accomplished substantially as effectively by other
means” which did not adversely affect the complaining minority
stockholder.61
Schwartz, however, was not grounded on the notion that the
stockholders should be considered as fiduciaries of one another like
partners in a partnership. Rather, this was a case in which the di
rectors, acting in their respective capacities as directors, authorized
the issuance of stock to themselves that resulted in a change of con
trol.62 Prior to the issuance, the plaintiff owned 50% of the out
standing common stock, and a second family owned the other
50%.63 Members of the second family controlled the board that
authorized the stock issuance that gave them control.64 Under uni
versally accepted principles of corporate governance, the defend
ants, as directors, owed the corporation a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation and, when their actions bene
fited them personally, they bore a heavy burden to demonstrate the
fairness of their actions.65 The New York court’s decision in
Schwartz v. Marien is just an application of this general principle
and, as such, it stands in contrast to Wilkes.66 In Wilkes, the de
57. Id.
58. Id.; see Schwartz v. Marien, 335 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1975).
59. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; see Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D.
Ga. 1972), aff’d 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 338.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 336.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Cheff v. Mathes, 199
A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (Del. 1962).
66. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 338, with Wilkes v. Springside Nursing
Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976).
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fendants also acted in their capacity as stockholders when they de
clined to reelect Wilkes to the Springside board,67 and therein lies
the radicalism of the Wilkes decision. It limits the ability of stock
holders, acting as stockholders, to act in their own interests, instead
burdening them with vague and unspecified duties to their fellow
stockholders.
Schwartz does bear a resemblance to Donahue but is distin
guishable from it. Both cases involve actions of the board of direc
tors dealing in corporate stock—in Schwartz an issuance and in
Donahue a repurchase.68 In both cases, the minority stockholder
complained of being precluded from participating, to their disad
vantage.69 There is, however, a subtle, but important, difference in
the cases. In Schwartz, the action of the directors benefited them
personally in their ability to control the corporation, but in Donahue the directors did not benefit personally.70 One member of their
family had his shares redeemed, but the defendant directors did not
receive the proceeds of the redemption.71 Indeed, the relative own
ership percentages of the remaining stockholders, including the
plaintiff, increased.72 While Schwartz, Wilkes, and Donahue are
certainly not inconsistent with one another, Donahue and Wilkes
represent an important extension of Schwartz.
Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co. 73 is even weaker authority for
the proposition that the controlling group must demonstrate a legit
imate business purpose for its actions. In Bryan, the plaintiff, a
15% stockholder in a closely held corporation, sought to enjoin a
squeeze-out merger that would convert his stock ownership interest
to cash.74 He brought his action under Rule 10b-5.75 The defend
ants had told the plaintiff that the company had decided to acquire
his stock because of “a longstanding company policy” to limit share
ownership to “active stockholders” and since plaintiff had retired
he was no longer “active.”76 But the court was unconvinced that
67. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661.
68. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 510 (Mass. 1975).
69. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
70. Compare Schwartz, 335 N.E.2d at 336, with Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
71. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 510.
72. Id.
73. Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062, 1066 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff’d,
490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1063 (citing the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Employment of Ma
nipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964)).
76. Id. at 1064.

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 11

WILKES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

27-SEP-11

9:02

349

this was, in fact, the company’s policy and, therefore, the merger
lacked a “business purpose.”77 The decision is less than a model of
clarity and the court never held that a merger lacking a business
purpose violates Rule 10b-5.78 Moreover, the court acknowledged
that “in the absence of fraudulent activity in the merger proceed
ings, the defendants’ position [that they need not demonstrate a
business purpose] is conceivably supported by law.”79 The court
went on to find such fraudulent activity—the defendants failed to
disclose certain information regarding the company’s expansion
plans.80
The case does include dicta supporting the holding in Wilkes,
including an assertion that the merger could “hardly be interpreted
to have been made in the best interest of [the plaintiff] as a minor
ity shareholder.”81 Ultimately, however, this is case about fraud,
not fiduciary duty.82 Bryan was decided during a period in which
the legality of squeeze-out mergers was being actively litigated in
the federal and state courts, the former under Rule 10b-5 and the
latter under state fiduciary principles.83 With respect to the former,
the United States Supreme Court ultimately held that Rule 10b-5
was limited to manipulative and deceptive devices and contriv
ances, and a mere breach of fiduciary duty unaccompanied by a
misrepresentation or misleading statement would not support an
action under the Rule.84 As to state claims, the Delaware Supreme
Court held in 1977 that a squeeze-out merger not motivated by a
legitimate business purpose was a breach of the directors’ fiduciary
duty.85 Six years later, however, that court reversed course and
held that such a merger was permissible, but the board of directors
had the burden of proving that such a merger was “entirely fair”—
in terms of price and process—to the minority shareholders.86
While not all state courts agree with this latter Delaware decision,87
77. Id. at 1068.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1067.
80. Id. at 1069.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1067.
83. See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1355 (1978) (describing and explaining how “litigation in
the freezeout field ha[d] become exceedingly active during the past ten years”).
84. Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
85. Singer v. Magnavox Co. 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
86. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
87. Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 492 N.E.2d 1112, 1116
17 (Mass. 1986).
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it seems fair to conclude that most courts would. The bottom line is
that Bryan was of questionable authority when decided and clearly
is no longer of any precedential value.
In short, then, Wilkes was, at the least, a generous extension of
the precedent cited by the court and, more accurately, a break from
it. Other cases, however, not cited by the Donahue or Wilkes
courts, do point in the direction of finding a fiduciary duty among
stockholders,88 and academic literature roughly contemporaneous
with Donahue and Wilkes,89 particularly work by F. Hodge
O’Neal,90 built on those cases to provide strong support for the
88. E.g., Bellevue Gardens, Inc. v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185, 186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
(upholding trial court’s ordering the equitable remedy of liquidation where a pattern of
conduct by the dominant stockholders was seriously prejudicial to the rights and inter
ests of the minority); Hartung v. Architects Hartung/Odle/Burke, Inc., 301 N.E.2d 240,
243 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973) (“[T]he shareholders in a close corporation, also referred to as
an ‘incorporated partnership,’ stand in a fiduciary relationship to each another.”);
Fewell v. Tappan, 27 N.W.2d 648, 654-55 (Minn. 1947) (holding that claims for fraud
and bad faith would be considered in light of an expectation of loyalty drawn from
partnership principles); Application of Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 715
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (drawing on partnership principles to determine whether a dissolu
tion of the corporation would be beneficial to the stockholders); Gaines v. Long Mfg.
Co., 67 S.E.2d 350, 353-55 (N.C. 1951) (analogizing the duty of a controlling stockholder
to that of a trustee and holding that an injunction was proper where minority stock
holder had no adequate remedy at law to address allegedly harmful issuance of stock by
the corporation); Browning v. C & C Plywood Corp., 434 P.2d 339, 343 (Or. 1967)
(finding squeeze out accomplished by issuance of shares was illegal; case remanded for
appropriate remedy).
89. See, e.g., F. O’NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
1971); F. O’NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); F. O’NEAL & J.
DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1961); see also Allen
B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for
Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (1969); Edwin J. Bradley, A Comparative Assess
ment of the California Close Corporation Provisions and a Proposal for Protecting Indi
vidual Participants, 9 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 865, 866 (1976) [hereinafter Comparative
Assessment]; Edwin J. Bradley, Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation—The Need
for More and Improved Legislation, 54 GEO. L.J. 1145, 1147 (1966) [hereinafter To
wards a More Perfect Close Corporation]; Michael W. Carnahan, Relief to Oppressed
Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnership Precepts and Related Considerations,
1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 409, 420; Gaston H. Gage, Close Corporations—Bad Faith of Major
ity, 35 N.C. L. REV. 271, 279 (1957); Comment, Minority Rights and the Corporate
“Squeeze” and “Freeze,” 1959 DUKE L.J. 436. In a symposium in the Northwestern
Law Review devoted to close corporations, one author concluded a discussion of mi
nority shareholders with this advice: “[I]t seems that the minority’s rights should be
enlarged to some extent, so that the legal tools which are placed in the hands of the
majority cannot be used as instruments of oppression.” Symposium, The Close Corpo
ration, 52 NW. U. L. REV. 345, 396 (1957).
90. O’Neal, a recognized authority on closely held corporations, joined the
faculty of the Washington University School of Law in 1977, was dean from 1980 to
1985, and was the George Alexander Madill Professor of Law when he retired in 1988.
Obituaries, F. Hodge O’Neal, 73, Ex-Law School Dean, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1991, at

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 13

27-SEP-11

WILKES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

9:02

351

Massachusetts court. O’Neal produced a treatise of over 600 pages
devoted to the plight of minority shareholders in closely held corpo
rations entitled Oppression of Minority Shareholders.91 The trea
tise has an unmistakable agenda—to identify the various ways that
minority shareholders are squeezed out of a corporation and to sug
gest legal theories and planning techniques to address the
problem.92
O’Neal’s treatise is as creative as it is thorough. For instance,
in the course of discussing the Wilkes problem (“§ 3.06 Eliminating
minority shareholders from directorate and excluding them from
company employment”), O’Neal advises: “if [a shareholder who is
dismissed from employment] has a cause of action against the ma
jority shareholders . . . based on oppressive acts they have commit
ted other than his discharge, he may be able to strengthen his case
by using his arbitrary dismissal to evidence their bad faith.”93
O’Neal promoted the idea that controlling shareholders owe
fiduciary duties to the minority, calling the contrary view “outmo
ded.”94 More importantly in the discussion of Donahue and Wilkes,
O’Neal argued for partnership duties among shareholders,95 charac
terizing a Wilkes-type squeeze out as “unjust.”96 He concluded his
treatise with a call to the judiciary and legislatures to take steps “to
prevent the oppression of minority shareholders who lacked either
the foresight or bargaining power to provide adequate protection
for themselves.”97 A few pages later he called for greater judicial
activism:
Even in the absence of a statute specifically conferring broad
powers on the courts to provide relief in shareholder disputes,
there is no reason why the courts themselves should not be more
energetic and imaginative in developing effective remedies for
majority oppression of minorities. On the whole, American
courts have been singularly conservative and unresourceful in
providing remedies for oppressed minority shareholders.98
D23. Earlier he had taught at the University of Mississippi and Vanderbilt University
and had been dean of the law schools at Mercer and Duke. Id. He died in 1991 at the
age of 73. Id.
91. F. HODGE O’NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975).
92. Id. at 1.
93. Id. at 80.
94. Id. at 508.
95. Id. at 508-28.
96. Id. at 526.
97. Id. at 582.
98. Id. at 587-88
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Clearly, the Massachusetts court in Donahue and Wilkes took
up the call.
Interestingly, O’Neal failed to give serious consideration to any
counter-argument to judicial intervention.99 For instance, where
the legislature has provided a comprehensive scheme of regulation,
is it appropriate for the courts to intervene?100 Does judicial inter
vention upset an implicit bargain that the parties have made? Is
judicial intervention a more efficient way to protect minority stock
holders than legislative action?101 Are courts well equipped to re
fashion the bargain that the parties have made? Such questions
may have caused other courts to eschew the Donahue/Wilkes ap
proach to close corporations and defer to the legislature.102 In any
event, O’Neal and other commentators at that time demonstrate
zealotry on the issue that is apparent in the Massachusetts decisions
as well.
II. THE COURT
The Donahue/Wilkes decisions must be considered with refer
ence to the jurists who wrote the opinions and in the context of
other decisions of the Massachusetts Court at or around the same
time. Both the Donahue and Wilkes opinions were written by
99. Professor Harry Henn, however, did express the view that a private, contract
solution might be preferable. HARRY HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 258, at 512
(1970). Henn did not seem to see a dire problem in the existing remedies for squeezedout shareholders, stating, “Ingeniousness on the part of counsel in drafting arrange
ments for the formation and operation of close corporations has, notwithstanding lack
of statutory and judicial differentiation, enabled close corporations to achieve most of
their legitimate objects thereby rendering the present situation tolerable to numerous
small business corporations.” Id.
100. Some commentators did seem concerned with this question. See Compara
tive Assessment, supra note 89, at 895-96; Toward a More Perfect Close Corporation,
supra note 89, at 1145-46; see also Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the Busi
ness Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 456, 484 (1985)
(discussing the business judgment rule and other judicially created substitutes).
101. Around the time of the Donahue/Wilkes decisions commentators were advo
cating for legislative solutions. See, e.g., Afterman, supra note 89, at 1076-77; Toward a
More Perfect Close Corporation, supra note 89, at 1145; F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corpo
rations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 BUS. LAW. 873, 881 (1978)
(summarizing developments in close corporation law and suggesting additional legisla
tion that would be desirable).
102. See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1381 (Del. 1993); Cookies Food
Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 1988); Pabich
v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 505-06 (Tex. App. 2002); see also Siegel, supra note 6, at 42728 (discussing jurisdictions that have eschewed the legal principles represented by
Wilkes/Donahue).
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Chief Justices of the Court.103 Chief Justice G. Joseph Tauro, au
thor of Donahue, presided from 1970 to 1976104 and Chief Justice
Edward J. Hennessey, author of Wilkes, presided from 1976 to
1989.105 Both justices earned reputations for persuasive writing,
thorough research, and careful case analysis attuned to individual
facts, but were also seen as “progressive,” overseeing fundamental
changes in many aspects of Massachusetts state law.106
Justice Tauro brought to the court a diverse professional career
and broad experience. Born in 1909 to poor Italian immigrants,107
he had been a general practitioner and trial lawyer for more than
three decades, Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor, and, at the
time of his nomination, Chief Justice of the Superior Court, the
state’s highest trial court.108 He had also been an active participant
in the business and civic affairs of his community and a leader in
professional organizations.109 This practice-oriented background
may explain why he was so willing to re-examine long-standing
precedents and abandon them in favor of more progressive posi
tions.110 In Donahue, for example, he eschewed a traditional analy
103. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 353 N.E.2d 657, 657 (Mass. 1976);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 505 (Mass. 1976).
104. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF REPORTER OF
DECISIONS, JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT (1804-PRESENT), available at
http://www.massreports.com/justices/AllJustices.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Honorable John M. Greaney, Dedication, Dedication to Honorable
Edward F. Hennessey, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. xxv, xxv (1990). Greaney observed that
Chief Justice Hennessey had “the courage to break from precedent where changing
societal values and conditions call[ed] for a new rule of law. . . . [Chief Justice Hennes
sey] adhered to the philosophy that stability in the law was important but should never
supplant the need for judges to exercise their ‘creative powers’ to fashion, whenever
necessary, thoughtful answers to difficult human problems.” Id.; see also Justice Benja
min Kaplan, Address to a Special Sitting of the Supreme Judicial Court: Memorial to the
Late Justice Robert Braucher, 387 Mass. 1223, 1226, 1230 (1982) (commenting on Justice
Braucher, Associate Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1971 to
1981: “[i]n a community of professed liberals, Bob pronounced himself a
conservative”).
107. Obituaries, G. Joseph Tauro, Was Chief Justice of SJC and Superior Court,
BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 7, 1994, at 18.
108. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, 61 MASS. L. Q. 19, 19 (1976).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning
common law distinctions between licensees, visitors, guests, etc. in favor of a single
“common duty of reasonable care”); Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 296
N.E.2d 461, 465 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning the doctrine of sovereign immunity when
government creates or maintains a private nuisance); Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway,
293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973) (abandoning common law doctrine that a tenant’s
obligation to pay rent is based solely upon his possession of the premises); George v.
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sis under corporate law, favored by the lower court,111 and instead
recognized a broad doctrine of protecting the expectations of mi
nority stockholders.
At the time of Tauro’s nomination, the Supreme Judicial Court
was overburdened with an unworkably high caseload.112 Within
two years of his appointment, Chief Justice Tauro oversaw the es
tablishment of a brand new intermediate appellate system.113 The
new appellate court was “the most significant change in the organi
zation of the Massachusetts court system” in over a century.114 Af
ter its establishment, Tauro wrote, “the appellate burdens on the
Supreme Judicial Court have been eased somewhat, thereby al
lowing the justices to devote more time and study to the decision of
those appeals presenting important legal issues of broad social im
pact.”115 A survey of cases decided during Tauro’s tenure demon
strates this progressive approach and the higher level of detail and
research each justice employed to support the Court’s decisions.
For example, Fiorentino v. Probate Court examined the consti
tutionality under the equal protection clause of a statutory two-year
residency requirement to file for divorce in Massachusetts and gen
erated two persuasive opinions, one the majority and one the dis
senting, presenting a detailed analysis of the issues and a
comprehensive review of the existing state and constitutional
law.116 Wilkes itself cites to a number of treatises and law review
articles in addition to case law to support its holding.117 This new
scholarly acumen was praised by the state’s bar journal, the Massa
chusetts Law Quarterly, which wrote, “The day of terse, unrea
soned, unanimous declaration of the law from on high is apparently
over. The day of the carefully, even meticulously exhibited reason
ing process underlying the final result . . . is thankfully before
us.”118
Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 918 (Mass. 1971) (allowing recovery for the inflic
tion of emotional distress not caused by the commission of a common law tort).
111. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1976) (stating
that the lower court had used corporate standards to find “that the purchase was with
out prejudice to the plaintiff and implicitly found that the transaction had been carried
out in good faith and with inherent fairness”).
112. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, supra note 108, at 21.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. G. Joseph Tauro, The State of the Judiciary-Annual Report of Chief Justice,
60 MASS. L. Q. 241, 251 (1975).
116. Fiorentino v. Prob. Ct., 310 N.E.2d 112, 112, 121-22 (Mass. 1974).
117. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
118. Case and Statute Comments, 59 MASS. L. Q. 175, 180 (1974).
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Overall, Tauro championed modernization in all facets of the
judicial system he inherited. He advocated for new courthouse fa
cilities, better trained trial attorneys, modern courthouse proce
dures and management, and, most importantly, modernization of
the civil law of the state.119 On this latter problem, he strongly be
lieved in judicial independence and wrote, “When dealing with a
rule of law originally established by judicial decision I believe that
its change, when required, should come by means of a judicial deci
sion. In these circumstances, I do not believe that we should look
to the Legislature for change.”120 Since the existence and scope of
the fiduciary relationship was traditionally developed by courts of
equity, and since the application of fiduciary principles in corporate
contexts had likewise been developed by judicial decision,121 it is
not hard to connect Tauro’s judicial philosophies with Donahue and
other progressive decisions marked by the “Tauro Era”122 of Mas
sachusetts jurisprudence.
The activism of the Supreme Judicial Court during the Tauro
Era is manifest in a number of decisions.123 For example, in Gau
dette v. Webb, the court created a new common law cause of action
for wrongful death in an area already the subject of legislation,
overruling five prior Massachusetts decisions that held the area
119. Honorable G. Joseph Tauro, supra note 108, at 21
120. Lombardo v. D. F. Frangioso & Co., 269 N.E.2d 836, 840 (Mass. 1971)
(Tauro, C.J., dissenting).
121. See, e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.)
(“To say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In
what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the conse
quences of his deviation from his duty?”); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 (1939)
(holding directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders); S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S.
483, 487 (1919) (controlling majority has fiduciary relation to minority).
122. Case and Statute Comments, 58 MASS. L. Q. 297, 327 (1973).
123. The court’s progressive tendencies are also apparent in a number of deci
sions. For instance, in Opinion of Justices, 298 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1973), the court
rendered an advisory opinion to the Governor that an anti-bussing bill then pending in
the Massachusetts House of Representatives violated the equal protection clauses of
the Constitutions of the United States and Massachusetts; in Board of Appeals of Hano
ver v. Housing Appeals Committee in Department of Community Affairs, 294 N.E.2d
393, 411 (Mass. 1973), the court made it much more difficult for municipalities to ex
clude low income housing; and in Green v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxa
tion, 305 N.E.2d 92, 95 (1973), the court held that a woman’s domicile for tax purposes
was not necessarily that of her husband’s. But see Commonwealth v. Olivo, 337 N.E.2d
904, 911 (Mass. 1975) (finding non-English speaking criminal defendant not entitled to
have criminal complaint in Spanish); Commonwealth v. Ross, 296 N.E.2d 810, 816
(Mass. 1973) (taking a narrow view of the extent to which a black defendant in a crimi
nal trial could require the judge, conducting a voir dire, to inquire into a potential ju
ror’s racial prejudice).
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completely in the province of statute.124 In effect, the decision cre
ated a common law right alongside the existing statutory recovery.
In Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, Justice Quirico’s dis
sent expressed the concern that the majority had gone too far in
imposing a broad, sweeping, and undefined warranty of habitability
on landlords.125 In Lewis v. Lewis, the court abolished the doctrine
of interspousal immunity in claims arising out of automobile acci
dents and held that the general principle of providing a remedy for
an injury outweighed the state’s statutory prohibition against interspousal suits.126 In Diaz v. Eli Lilly and Co. the court overruled
longstanding precedent that denied a wife a claim against a negli
gent tortfeasor for loss of consortium as a result of injuries to her
husband.127 Finally, in Donahue, the court could have found for the
minority shareholder based upon a breach of the defendants’ fiduci
ary obligation as directors.128 Several existing Massachusetts deci
sions would have supported this analysis,129 thus avoiding its
judicially-created heightened fiduciary standard among close corpo
ration stockholders.
Overall, the judicial attitudes of both the Tauro and Hennessey
Supreme Judicial Courts can be summarized as progressive with an
eye towards modernization of the law and an adherence to the idea
124. Gaudette v. Webb, 284 N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1971).
125. Bos. Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 851 (Mass. 1973) (Quirico,
J., dissenting).
126. Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 527-32 (Mass. 1976).
127. Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555, 558, 562, 564 (Mass. 1973).
128. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1975). Put
simply, the court could have ruled that through the buy-out the directors benefited
indirectly or, for purposes of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, directors dealing with a
family member have a conflict of interest.
129. See, e.g., Anderson v. Albert & J.M. Anderson Mfg. Co., 90 N.E.2d 541, 544
(Mass. 1950) (“Directors cannot take advantage of their official position to manipulate
the issue and purchase of shares of the stock of the corporation in order to secure for
themselves the control of the corporation and then to place the ownership of the stock
in such a position as will perpetuate that control. Such action constitutes a breach of
their fiduciary obligations to the corporation and a wilful disregard of the rights of the
other stockholders.”); L.E. Fosgate Co. v. Bos. Mkt. Terminal Co., 175 N.E. 86, 108
(Mass. 1931) (“It is settled that the directors of a corporation cannot lawfully issue
treasury stock to themselves or to a confederate for the purpose of gaining control of
the corporation without giving the other stockholders an opportunity to subscribe.” (cit
ing Elliott v. Baker, 80 N.E. 450 (Mass. 1907))); Elliott, 80 N.E. at 452 (“The directors
of a corporation act in a strictly fiduciary capacity. Their office is one of trust and they
are held to the high standard of duty required of trustees. . . . Corporate directors
cannot manipulate the property, of which they have control in a trust [relation], prima
rily with the intent to secure a majority of the stock or of directors in any particular
interest.”).
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of fundamental fairness. The court was willing to take a fresh look
at the rationale and application of the law in light of changing social
and economic conditions. Through numerous groundbreaking deci
sions in torts,130 zoning and land use,131 corporations,132 criminal
law,133 and more,134 the court saw that society was rapidly changing
130. E.g., Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 1975) (rec
ognizing a cause of action on behalf of a fetus whose death was caused by a negligent
injury to the mother); Pridgen v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 308 N.E.2d 467, 477 (Mass. 1974)
(finding landowner liable for injuries to trespasser caused by nonfeasance); Diaz, 302
N.E.2d at 564 (allowing wives, not just husbands, to bring a cause of action for loss of
consortium); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 298 N.E.2d 847, 858-59 (Mass. 1973) (establishing
new law that a public official acting in good faith and without malice or corruption is
not liable to a private party for negligence or other error in making a decision within
the scope of his authority); George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 268 N.E.2d 915, 921 (Mass.
1971) (establishing emotional distress as an actionable tort in Massachusetts).
131. See, e.g., Blakeley v. Gorin, 313 N.E.2d 903, 903 (Mass. 1974) (eminent do
main case); Cameron v. Zoning Agent of Bellingham, 260 N.E.2d 143, 146 (Mass. 1970)
(allowing different treatment of public housing units under town zoning laws); McNeely
v. Bd. of Appeal of Bos., 261 N.E.2d 336, 345 (Mass. 1970) (holding a private university
must comply with zoning regulations).
132. In addition to Donahue and Wilkes, see Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971), where the Court departed from the Model Penal Code
and held that the position a person holds in a corporation is not the criterion for estab
lishing corporate criminal liability. The Code stated that a corporation was criminally
liable only if the culpable activity “was performed, authorized, ratified, adopted or tol
erated by the corporation’s directors, officers or other ‘high managerial agents.’” Id. at
71-72 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Final Draft 1962)). Rejecting
this rule, the court held that liability would occur if “the corporation ha[d] placed [an]
agent in a position where he has enough authority and responsibility to act for and in
behalf of the corporation in handling the particular corporate business, operation or
project in which he was engaged at the time he committed the criminal act.” Id. at 86.
In Petruzzi v. Peduka Constr. Inc., 285 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1972), the court enforced a
vague corporate compensation agreement that was never reduced to writing or re
flected in corporate minutes because of the nature of small corporations and the infor
mality in which they are often run.
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 327 N.E.2d 662, 667 (Mass. 1975) (void
ing Massachusetts’s mandatory death penalty for rape-murder on the principle that the
right to life is fundamental and due process requires that the state bears the burden to
demonstrate a compelling interest in execution that could not be served by any less
restrictive means); Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 828 (Mass. 1973) (grant
ing criminal defendants a “mandatory statutory right[ ]” to cross-examine prosecution
witnesses and present testimony before a determination of probable cause at prelimi
nary hearings); Commonwealth v. Henson, 259 N.E.2d 769, 772 (Mass. 1970) (looking
to objective circumstances of the crime, and not defendant’s mens rea, in affirming con
viction for assault with a dangerous weapon).
134. See, e.g., A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 347 N.E.2d 677, 684-85 (Mass. 1976)
(spelling out guidelines for transfer hearings that determine whether a juvenile offender
should be tried as an adult); Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Att’y Gen., 326 N.E.2d 334,
339 (Mass. 1975) (finding state attorney general may refuse to prosecute an appeal de
spite request of governor to do so); Fiorentino v. Prob. Ct., 310 N.E.2d 112, 115, 121
(Mass. 1974) (holding two-year statutory residency requirement for obtaining a divorce
based on cause outside the state is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause).

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

358

unknown

Seq: 20

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

27-SEP-11

9:02

[Vol. 33:339

and felt that existing common law precepts were no longer useful or
applicable in remedying important issues.135 Also, perhaps due to
the newly acquired luxury of more time for research and writing,
the court’s opinions often moved to discussions of the law beyond
the disposition of the issue of the case.136 This willingness to both
extend existing law and fashion brand new law based on the practi
cal realities of conflicts before it fits the reasoning and conclusions
displayed in both Donahue and Wilkes.137
III.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS PROTECTING
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

Remarkably, Massachusetts is among a minority of states
whose corporate code provides no special protection for minority
stockholders.138 This is particularly striking inasmuch as the Massa
chusetts legislature adopted a substantially revised corporate code
in 2004 modeled after the ABA’s revised Model Business Corpora
tion Act (MBCA).139 The MBCA includes a provision, widely
adopted,140 that authorizes a court to dissolve a corporation if “the
135. In the Supreme Judicial Court–Tort–Common Law Wrongful Death Action
Created, 57 Mass. L.Q. 293, 297 (1972); Cases & Statute Comments, 58 Mass. L.Q. 299,
321 (1973).
136. See, e.g., Morash & Sons, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 461, 465 (Mass.
1973) (moving on from its holding on private nuisance to discuss the doctrine of sover
eign immunity from tort liability generally); see also Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43,
57 (Mass. 1973). In response to the Court’s abolishment of the common law distinctions
between invitees, licensees or trespassers, Justice Quirico’s partial dissent states, “I am
unable to agree with the use of the present case as the vehicle for the promulgation of
such a broad new rule of law which purports to have application beyond what I believe
to be the scope and necessities of the present case.” Id. at 55. Later, he writes: “The
briefs and oral arguments before this court did not concern themselves with such a
rule. . . . If such a fundamental change in our law is otherwise desirable, it should more
appropriately be accomplished in a case in which the issue is raised, in which the court
has the benefit of briefs and arguments directed specifically thereto, and in which the
court can better weigh and consider the far reaching implications and consequences of
such a change.” Id. at 57.
137. See Mounsey, 297 N.E.2d at 53; see also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
328 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Mass. 1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d
657, 657 (Mass. 1976).
138. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, §§ 1.01-17.04 (2008).
139. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii) (2007). This provision has been
adopted in some form by all fifty states. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. (rev. 2009).
The introduction to the new Massachusetts act stated that it “is the first comprehensive
revision of the Massachusetts law governing business corporations in approximately 100
years and is based on, but is not identical to, the American Bar Association’s Model
Business Corporation Act.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, cmt. (2008).
140. As of 2010, twenty-three states have adopted a provision modeled after the
Model Business Corporation Act’s § 14.30(2)(ii). See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5)

\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE204.txt

2011]

unknown

Seq: 21

WILKES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

27-SEP-11

9:02

359

directors or those in control of the corporation have acted, are act
ing, or will act in a manner that is illegal, oppressive, or fraudu
lent.”141 This provision has been interpreted fairly broadly in a
number of courts, giving the judiciary considerable leverage to re
quire those in control of a corporation to deal fairly with minority
shareholders.142 According to an article that appeared in the Mas
sachusetts Law Review, the drafters of the Massachusetts act had as
a goal “to facilitate legislative adoption” and, apparently, achieving
that goal required the “[n]on-disturbance of special Massachusetts
close corporation jurisprudence (Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.
of New England and its progeny).”143 The predecessor Massachu
setts corporate code also was silent on protecting minority stock
holders.144 Thus, in Massachusetts it is fair to say that the statute
contemplates a special role for the judiciary in terms of protecting
minority stockholders.
In contrast to Massachusetts, a number of states had various
provisions protecting minority stockholders in the mid-1970s, when
(2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1430 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-1108 (2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-301 (2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-896 (2007); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-940 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-411 (LexisNexis 2008); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 30-1-1430 (2005); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12.56 (West 2004 & Supp.
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1430 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 1430
(2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-14.30 (West 2009 & Supp 2009); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.494 (West 2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,
162 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-30 (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 441-1203
(West Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 60.661(2)(b), 60.952 (West 2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-1430 (2007); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-24-301 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1430 (LexisNexis 2009); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11A, § 14.30 (1997).
141. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii).
142. See, e.g., Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985) (citing
Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)) (adopting a “rea
sonable expectations” interpretation of oppression under Alaska’s dissolution statute);
Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 402, 404-05 (Colo. App. 2000) (interpreting
Colorado’s oppression statute to be a “broad and flexible” tool that considers fiduciary
duties owed to minority shareholders, reasonable shareholder expectations, and overall
fairness); see also John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to
Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 701-09 (2007)
(providing a state-by-state survey of dissolution statutes and the judicial interpretation
of those provisions). Some courts have even recognized a right to judicial dissolution in
the absence of a statute so providing. See, e.g., Leibert v. Clapp, 196 N.E.2d 540, 546
(N.Y. 1963).
143. Jerry Cohen & Jonathan C. Guest, Case and Statute Comment, The New
Massachusetts Business Corporation Act, Chapter 127, Acts of 2003, 88 MASS. L. REV.
213, 213 (2004).
144. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156D, §§ 1-55.
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Donahue and Wilkes were decided.145 The primary means of pro
tection was the statute referred to above, giving the courts the
power to dissolve the corporation if a minority shareholder could
demonstrate “illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.”146 This
provision has been a part of the Model Business Corporation Act
since its first iteration in 1946.147 Other states, however, went be
yond this simple dissolution provision. In 1972, New Jersey
adopted provisions greatly enhancing the position of minority
shareholders. For instance, the courts were authorized to order
remedies other than dissolution and, at the same time, the threshold
for ordering dissolution was lowered:
The Superior Court . . . may appoint a custodian, appoint a provi
sional director, order a sale of the corporation’s stock as pro
vided below, or enter a judgment dissolving the corporation,
upon proof that . . . in the case of a corporation having 25 or less
shareholders, the directors or those in control have acted fraudu
lently or illegally, mismanaged the corporation, or abused their
authority as officers or directors or have acted oppressively or
unfairly toward one or more minority shareholders in their ca
pacities as shareholders, directors, officers, or employees.148

In 1975, the California legislature amended its corporate code
to authorize the dissolution of a corporation when “[t]hose in con
trol of the corporation have been guilty of or have knowingly coun
tenanced persistent and pervasive fraud, mismanagement or abuse
of authority or persistent unfairness towards any shareholders.”149
The prompting of O’Neal and others was having its affect on
state legislatures;150 and the decisions in Donahue and Wilkes, if
anything, spurred on this development. In 1981, Minnesota began
145. See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7201 to 17-7216 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
13A §§ 102(5), 701, 703 (1974) (repealed by ME. BUS. CORP. ACT c. 640 § A-1, 2001
Me. Laws 1464, 1464); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1101-45-.1151 (West 2002); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(1)(c) (West 2003); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAWS § 620 (McKinney
2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1999).
146. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2)(ii).
147. Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48
BUS. LAW. 699, 711 (1993) (citing Report of the Committee on Corporation Law in
Proceedings of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law at the
Annual Meeting in Atlantic City, N.J. (Oct. 28-29, 1946)).
148. New Jersey Business Corporation Act, ch. 366, 1973 N.J. LAWS 964, 1036-37
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West 2003)).
149. Act effective January 1, 1977, ch. 683, 1975 CAL. STAT. 1514, 1597-98 (codi
fied as amended at CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 2009)).
150. See generally Matheson & Maler, supra note 142, at 662-74 (reviewing these
statutory developments).
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down a path of greater protection for minority shareholders, first
with a provision that authorized judicial dissolution for behavior
“persistently unfair” to the minority151 and, two years later, for be
havior that was merely “unfairly prejudicial.”152 The Minnesota
law also authorized a court to order a buyout of a minority share
holder, and, in considering whether to grant equitable relief, the
court should consider the “reasonable expectations” of the com
plaining shareholder.153 A few years later, the North Dakota legis
lature passed a similar statute, again focusing on the “reasonable
expectations” of the shareholders.154 Alaska155 and Oregon156 soon
followed suit and, in 1990, the ABA amended the Model Business
Corporation Act adding section 14.34.157 Under this section, if a
shareholder of a closely held corporation has petitioned for dissolu
tion under section 14.30(2), which includes a claim of oppression,
the corporation or one or more shareholders may elect to purchase
the shares of the petitioning shareholder at fair value.158
IV.

JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST 35 YEARS AND
ADVENT OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

THE

A. Judicial Developments Since 1975
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a complete or
thorough analysis of the considerable number of cases involving the
rights of minority shareholders over the past thirty-five years. A
few observations, however, are in order. First, Donahue and Wilkes
have been widely cited, both in judicial opinions and in the aca
151. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 2004).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. North Dakota Business Corporation Act, ch. 147, § 3, 1985 N.D. LAWS 411
13 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 (2010)).
155. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5) (2008) (permitting dissolution for corpora
tions with thirty-five or fewer shareholders when “liquidation is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or
shareholders”).
156. See Act of June 5, 2001, ch. 316, § 58, 2001 Or. Laws 738, 761 (codified as
amended at OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661(2)). In 2001, the Oregon legislature adopted an
expanded buyout provision for shareholders in close corporations that includes the rea
sonable expectations language. Id.
157. See A Report of the Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act–Amendments Pertaining to Closely Held Corpora
tions, 46 BUS. LAW. 297, 298-99 (1990).
158. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34 (2007).
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demic literature.159 Courts have cited the opinions, together with
O’Neal’s treatise, to rationalize the protection of minority share
holders.160 The tendency of the courts has been to construe the
“oppression” statutes broadly so that oppression includes disap
pointing the reasonable expectations of the minority shareholder.161
This is, of course, the essence of Wilkes. While the Massachusetts
court did not use the term “reasonable expectations,” the plaintiff
was granted relief precisely for that reason—Wilkes became in
volved in Springside, the court said, “with the expectation that he
would continue to participate in corporate decisions.”162 Donahue
and Wilkes probably are favored by most academics,163 who, in
turn, assume that the decisions represent the majority rule in the
United States.164
This infatuation with Donahue and Wilkes is not, however,
without its detractors. In her 2004 analysis of the legacy of these
decisions, Professor Mary Siegel reaches a different conclusion,
finding that “only five states . . . adopt the position that all share
holders in close corporations owe enhanced, partnership fiduciary
159. A Shepard’s search result for Wilkes conducted on July 6, 2010 produced 530
total citations including 150 citing decisions and 192 citing law review articles. A Shep
ard’s search result for Donahue on the same day produced 847 total citations including
281 citing decisions and 316 law review articles. SHEPARD REPORT FOR WILKES V. SPR
INGSIDE NURSING HOME INC., LEXISNEXIS, www.Lexisnexis.com (Select Shepardize
and search for Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657) (last visited
October 20, 2010).
160. See, e.g., Maschmeier v. Southside Press, Ltd., 435 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1988) (adopting broad view of oppression); In re the Judicial Dissolution of
Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (“A shareholder who reasonably
expected that ownership in the corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of
corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some other form of security
would be oppressed in a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat
those expectations.”); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387 (N.D. 1987) (citing
Kemp); Davis v. Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). See generally Math
eson & Maler, supra note 142, at 676-80 (discussing these cases). “While the reasonable
expectations model may not yet fully represent a majority rule, courts in at least twentyone states have applied the language in some form. Courts in several states have
adopted the reasonable expectations test without ‘enabling’ language from the statute
itself; that is, courts have applied the test even when the statute only provides that
dissolution is available when conduct is ‘oppressive.’” Id. at 679 (footnotes omitted).
161. See cases cited supra note 160.
162. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664.
163. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 380 (concluding that articles on this topic cite the
Massachusetts cases as “uniformly depict[ing] the [holdings in Donahue and Wilkes] as
the superior rule”).
164. Id. (explaining that academic writings “characterize the Delaware . . . view
as an unfortunate aberration from the national norm,” meaning the Massachusetts
approach).
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duties to each other.”165 While she did find that some states have
adopted some aspects of this position or expressed sympathy for it,
she nonetheless concludes that “[e]ven the most generous interpre
tation, however, cannot transform the Massachusetts rule into any
thing resembling a true majority rule.”166
Professor Siegel also analyzes a number of post-Wilkes deci
sions in Massachusetts, finding that these decisions narrow or limit
the broad holdings of Donahue and Wilkes.167 For instance, she
cites Merola v. Exergen, where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court upheld the firing of a minority shareholder, despite the ab
sence of a legitimate business purpose, because those controlling
the corporation needed “some room to maneuver.”168 The Merola
court held that for a shareholder’s expectation of employment to be
reasonable, and thus garner the protections of the Wilkes rule,
there must be a general policy regarding ownership and employ
ment, stock acquisition must be a condition of employment, and
there must be a history of distributing profits in the form of com
pensation.169 While not overruled, Wilkes was cabined. Other
Massachusetts cases similarly limited the reach of Donahue and
Wilkes.170
Against this ambivalence in Massachusetts, Professor Siegel
analyzed a number of cases from outside of Massachusetts, led by
Delaware,171 which reject the Massachusetts rule, in whole or in
part.172 While the Delaware cases do clearly reject the Massachu
setts rule, most other state court decisions are less emphatic in their
165. Id. at 382.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 396-98.
168. Id. at 394; Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 354-55 (Mass. 1996).
169. Merola, 668 N.E.2d at 354-55.
170. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 395-98 nn.91-108 (citing Horizon House-Micro
wave, Inc. v. Bazzy, 486 N.E.2d 70, 77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding freeze-out
merger)); Goode v. Ryan, 489 N.E.2d 1001, 1005 (Mass. 1986) (finding no general duty
to purchase minority shareholder’s stock on death). Professor Siegel cited a number of
cases that required the minority shareholder to bring claims based on excessive com
pensation derivatively, which means that the claim that such compensation freezes-out
minority shareholders was rejected. See Siegel, supra note 6, at 395, n.93.
171. Id. at 423-35.
172. E.g., Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 39 (Del. 1996) (holding
that contract precludes claim based on fiduciary duty); Ueltzhoffer, v. Fox Fire Devel
opment Co., No. 9871, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 204, at *22 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1991), aff’d,
618 A.2d 90 (Del. 1992) (finding for the plaintiff, but declining to base its decision on
fiduciary duty). From these and other cases, Professor Siegel concludes, among other
things, that “Delaware’s position is that all corporations are to be governed by corpo
rate, not partnership, principles.” Siegel, supra note 6, at 410.
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refusal to distinguish between closely held and publicly held corpo
rations.173 In my opinion, a broad look at these cases suggests that
the basic idea of Donahue and Wilkes—that in closely held corpo
rations those controlling the corporation owe some fiduciary duties
to the minority shareholders—seems fairly well accepted. Profes
sor Siegel is correct, I believe, that the Massachusetts rule has been
overstated and that its legacy is an evolving one. Perhaps this is the
fairest conclusion that can be drawn from her analysis.
B. The Advent of the Limited Liability Company
One would be remiss, I believe, in providing an historical anal
ysis of the Donahue and Wilkes cases without mentioning the im
pact of the limited liability company (LLC). This business entity
first appeared in Wyoming shortly after Wilkes was decided. A Wy
oming statute, passed in 1977, sought to create an entity with the
tax attributes of a partnership, but with limited liability for all of the
participants.174 When the Internal Revenue Service indicated that
a Wyoming limited liability company would be taxed as a partner
ship,175 LLC statutes were quickly passed in jurisdictions across the
country.176 Today, all states have limited liability company acts,
there have been two uniform limited liability company acts promul
gated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws,177 and the LLC has become the dominant form of busi
ness entity in the United States for newly formed businesses.178
What is important here is that LLCs are perceived to be con
tractual entities179 in contrast to corporations, which are generally
173. Siegel, supra note 6, at 411 n.185.
174. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101
147 (2009).
175. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-C.B. 360; see also Announcement 88-118, 1988-38
I.R.B. 26; Joseph C. Vitek, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, 27 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 191, 197 (1993).
176. Jimmy G. McLaughlin, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for
Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231, 231 (1993).
177. UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 101-1206 (1996); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB.
CO. ACT §§ 101-1106 (2006).
178. See Rodney D. Chrisman, Essay, LLCs are the New King of the Hill: An
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the
United States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006,
15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 460 (2010). The total number of new domestic
LLCs formed in 2007 was 1,375,148, as opposed to 747,533 for new domestic corpora
tions. Id. at 475. Thus, there were 1,839 new domestic LLCs formed in 2007 for every
one new domestic corporation. Id.
179. E.g., Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 23, 2009) (noting that an exculpatory provision “is permissible under the Dela
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thought to be governed by mandatory statutory provisions.180 The
typical limited liability company act contains few protections for
members and most of these protections are waivable in the operat
ing agreement.181 Indeed, in many limited liability company acts,
the only nonwaivable protection for members of the limited liability
company is the requirement that the managers of the company act
in good faith.182 In the world of business entities, then, statutory
corporate law should provide any protections to which shareholders
are entitled, while members of a limited liability company should
look to the terms of the operating agreement for their protection.
Cases like Donahue and Wilkes, however, disturb this neat bal
ance. Under these cases, courts of equity can monitor the way mi
nority stockholders are treated and provide a judicially created
remedy when that treatment falls short of what the court perceives
as fair treatment. Massachusetts statutory law now supports this
view, as the Massachusetts Business Corporation Act, in deference
to the Massachusetts courts, contains no special protections for mi
nority stockholders.183 A critical question for the future is whether
the free-wheeling nature of the Donahue and Wilkes cases will be
repeated in the realm of limited liability company law. Moreover,
is it appropriate to treat an LLC as an “incorporated partnership,”
the basis for holding shareholders in a closely held corporation to
partnership fiduciary duties? Will the Massachusetts courts treat an
operating agreement like a corporate code; that is, they will treat it
as an incomplete record of protections to be afforded to those with
a minority stake and not in control?
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has taken that path.
In Pointer v. Castellani the court, citing Donahue and Wilkes, held
that the president of an LLC, who also owned a forty-three percent
interest in the LLC, was wrongfully frozen-out when the other
ware Limited Liability Company Act and the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited Part
nership Act, where freedom of contract is the guiding and overriding principle, it is
expressly forbidden by the [Delaware General Corporation Law]”). See generally My
ron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 (2009).
180. See Mark J. Loewenstein, A New Direction for State Corporate Codes, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 453, 457-66 (1997).
181. U.L.L.C.A. § 103(b)(4) (2006) (“The operating agreement may not . . . elimi
nate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section 409(d), but the operat
ing agreement may determine the standards by which performance of the obligation is
to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.”).
182. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-108 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18
1101(E) (2005).
183. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
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members removed him from his position.184 The court upheld the
lower court’s findings that the reasons for his dismissal were pretex
tual and, to the extent that the plaintiff did act inappropriately,
there were measures short of dismissal (i.e., “communication” with
the plaintiff)185 that should have been employed by the defend
ants.186 What is troubling about this decision, however, is that the
court summarily concluded that the LLC met the definition of a
“close corporation”187 and, therefore, under Donahue the “stock
holders” owe fiduciary duties to one another.188 The court never
considered whether a limited liability company should be treated
differently than a corporation and, indeed, never acknowledged
that the parties to this litigation had formed a limited liability com
pany.189 In fact, the court referred to the limited liability company
as a “closely held corporate entity.”190 To those who trumpet the
limited liability company as a contractual entity in which parties

184. Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 818, 823 (Mass. 2009).
185. Id. at 818.
186. Id. at 818, 823.
187. Id. at 815.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 808. Pointer is not the only Massachusetts case applying Wilkes and
Donahue to an LLC. In One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith, the appellate court
affirmed a judgment in favor of a member of an LLC who complained that, in failing to
abide by a buy-out agreement and in various other ways, his co-members breached their
fiduciary duty to him. One to One Interactive, LLC v. Landrith, 920 N.E.2d 303, 306,
311 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010). Interestingly, the appellate court noted that the defendants
admitted that they owed fiduciary duties to the plaintiff and the court went on to con
clude that this duty was breached because the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations were
frustrated, citing Wilkes. Id. at 308. In Holland v. Burke, the trial court, without dis
cussion, assumed that Donahue and Wilkes applied to an LLC, although the plaintiff
was unsuccessful in persuading the court that the defendants had breached any such
fiduciary duties. Holland v. Burke, No. BACV200500122A, 2008 WL 4514664, at *6,
*12 (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 18, 2008); see also Mastromatteo v. Mastromatteo, No.
061329C, 2006 WL 3759512, at *2 (Mass. Dist. Ct. Nov. 28, 2006) (proceeding on the
assumption that Donahue applied to LLC). The Tennessee appellate court also has
ruled that the members of an LLC owe fiduciary duties to one another:
Pursuant to the above analysis, we are of the opinion that finding a majority
shareholder [sic] of an LLC stands in a fiduciary relationship to the minority,
similar to the Supreme Court’s teaching in Nelson [v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643
(Tenn.1997)], regarding a corporation, is warranted in this case. Such a holding
does not conflict with the statute, and is in keeping with the statutory require
ment that each LLC member discharge all of his or her duties in good faith.
Anderson v. Wilder, No. E2003-00460-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL 22768666, at *6 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2003) (citing Nelson v. Martin, 958 S.W.2d 643, 649-51 (Tenn. 1997)).
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must protect themselves, the possibility that courts will interfere
poses a serious risk.191
It is conceivable—perhaps probable—that more courts will
treat LLCs as “incorporated partnerships” with the members owing
one another fiduciary duties, notwithstanding any provisions in the
statute that suggest otherwise. This would be an unfortunate devel
opment. Organizers of LLCs would have to anticipate and draft
around such decisions, adding transaction costs to the formation of
the entity. Another upshot will be the migration of LLC formation
to Delaware, where the courts appear to be less inclined to blur the
line between actual partnerships and LLCs.
CONCLUSION
Looking back at the questions posed at the beginning of this
Article, it should be apparent that an examination of the history of
Donahue and Wilkes does not provide easy answers and, indeed,
raises additional questions. The decisions were indeed path break
ing, although they do reflect a judicial endorsement of forcefully
stated academic positions and were decided against a background
of cases expressing concern for the plight of minority stockhold
ers.192 Donahue and Wilkes are best understood as the product of a
particularly activist state court, headed by judges with strong pro
gressive philosophies generated by their life experiences.
The decisions have influenced courts around the country and
are prominently discussed. Careful scholarship, however, has
demonstrated that they are not as dominant as conventional wis
dom suggests. Academic writing, which helped bring about the de
cisions, now, for the most part, continues to promote the principles
that those decisions established.193
As to the effect of the decisions on state legislatures, it is not
easy to draw many conclusions. One inference, however, does
seem clear: the Massachusetts legislature has abdicated to the Mas
sachusetts courts the task of protecting minority stockholders from
overreaching and oppressive conduct by those controlling Massa
chusetts corporations.194 Less clear is the effect on other state legis
latures. My impression is that the Donahue and Wilkes decisions
191. See, e.g., Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware
Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2005).
192. See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 137-143 and accompanying text.
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heightened awareness across the country that minority stockholders
were in a vulnerable position and, in response, many state legisla
tures and courts have responded.
The legacy of these decisions, however, does not end with the
direct response to them. As more litigation involving limited liabil
ity companies occurs and is reported, we are likely to see courts
expressing concern over “oppressive” conduct suffered by LLC
members who failed to bargain, or bargained and failed, to protect
themselves.195 Will Donahue and Wilkes then have a second life?
Only time will tell.196

195. The call for judicial protection of members of a limited liability company has
begun in the academy. See Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liabil
ity Company: Learning (or not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 883, 976 (2005) (“Just as courts developed the oppression doctrine to protect mi
nority shareholders in close corporations, so too should courts extend the oppression
doctrine to safeguard minority members in LLCs. Learning from close corporation his
tory, in other words, is important to the LLC’s future.”).
196. Other than a single case from Tennessee and the Massachusetts cases de
scribed in note 190, supra, it appears that neither Donahue nor Wilkes has been cited
by a court deciding a limited liability company case. A search run on July 8, 2010 on
WestLaw with the search query (WILKES /2 SPRINGSIDE) (DONAHUE /2 RODD)
& LLC “LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY” in the database “allcases” yielded no
additional cases. ALLCASES SEARCH, WESTLAW, www.westlaw.com (search for
(WILKES /2 SPRINGSIDE) (DONAHUE /2 RODD) & LLC “LIMITED LIABIL
ITY COMPANY”) (last visited July8, 2010). On the other hand, there are cases such
Yessenow v. Hudson, where, reminiscent of Donahue and Wilkes, the court said “LLCs
often have few members, who are regarded more as partners with direct obligations to
one another than as mere shareholders in a corporation.” Yessenow v. Hudson, No.
2:08-CV-353 PPS, 2009 WL 1543495, at *4 (N.D. Ind. June 2, 2009); see also Bushi v.
Sage Health Care, PLLC, 203 P.3d 694, 699 (Idaho 2009) (“We conclude that, under
Idaho’s original LLC act, members of an LLC owe one another fiduciary duties.”). But
see Kaplan v. O.K. Technologies, L.L.C., 675 S.E.2d 133, 140-41 (N.C. App. 2009) (bas
ing decision on the operating agreement, the court rejected the argument that members
of a closely held LLC owe fiduciary duties to one another).
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